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Enjoyment in Levinas and 
the Aesthetics of Everyday Life
Alfonso Hoyos Morales
Through the concept of enjoyment in Levinas, this paper examines the phenomenological and 
ontological dimension of everyday aesthetics. Enjoyment, in Levinas, forms an essential element in the 
constitution of the subjectivity of the human being and is no longer to be seen as a  moment of 
‘inauthenticity’ or ‘alienation’. The experience of the objects of everyday experience is not related to 
that of objects of representation or of tools, but rather to that of a system of nourishment into which the 
subject is integrated, as in an ‘element’ or ‘atmosphere’. This constitutive closeness of enjoyment 
indicates the fundamental difference between what we understand as everyday aesthetics and other 
aesthetics characterised by contemplation or disinterest. | Keywords: Levinas, Enjoyment, Everyday 
Aesthetics, Phenomenology, Beauty, Sublime
1. Introduction
It is night and we get home tired. Once we open the front door, we turn on the 
light, which has a  slight orange touch. It is neither too bright nor too dark, 
however it illuminates the objects with a  night halo that is clear enough to 
make them recognisable without highlighting. We take off our clothes and 
shoes and put on pyjamas whose texture immediately announces relaxation 
and calm. We are hungry and go to the kitchen to prepare dinner. While we 
do it, we put on a playlist that we play every night, full of songs that we have 
heard dozens of times. We know them by heart and there is nothing 
unpredictable in them, rather, we already advance each phrase that is going to 
be sung and each note that is going to be played. All the music that is being 
played is included in a playlist called, ‘music for cooking’. No song stands out 
from any other, none steps on the next, but they all follow each other 
harmoniously, maintaining a  homogeneous style as if they were part of an 
extensive medley. It also seems that the rhythm of the music matches our 
rhythm as we cut the potatoes and aubergines or beat the eggs. We are not 
paying attention to the music too much, in fact at times we forget that it is 
playing. However it is there, along with the light that rests slightly on 
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1 As Husserl (1983, p. 51) already pointed out: “The world is there for me not only as a world of 
mere things, but also with the same immediacy as a world of objects with values, a world of 
goods. I simply find the physical things in front of me furnished not only with merely material 
determinations but also with value-characteristics as beautiful and ugly, pleasant and 
unpleasant, agreeable and disagreeable, and the like [...] These value-characteristics and 
practical characteristics also belong constitutively to the Objects ‘on hand’ as Objects 
regardless or not I turn to such characteristics and the Objects.” 
the  objects; the pyjamas that caresses our body announcing rest and 
relaxation; the aroma of the food in the night background; perhaps the distant 
sound of cars or of the television in the living room sending out its tunes from 
the centre of the house like the crackling of a fireplace, but also together with 
the passing of the day that we feel concentrated on that precise moment, as if 
the night accumulated at that very moment all the weight of work at the time 
we could finally relax. All these senses and affections create a  whole of 
sensations where the comfort of the pyjamas does not stand out from the 
musical harmonies nor from the aroma of the food that we are in the process of 
making. They are all part of the same silent symphony which, precisely because 
of its harmony and extreme familiarity, we no longer listen to, but which 
shapes each of our nights and which we feel as close as our own skin.
The music, the clothes, the soup, the sounds, the weight of the hours are not 
here as an object of contemplation, they are not the direct object of the phrase, 
rather they constitute a  circumstantial complement of the place. We are in 
them and not in front of them, they are the customary framework through 
which things can appear a posteriori.
This undifferentiated space of sensations will constitute the centre of the 
reflections on the aesthetics of the everyday that will be carried out in the 
following pages. I will not be interested in romanticising these experiences, but 
in exposing their ontological dimension in our constitution as subjects. Things, 
rather than being merely useful, are values to which we adhere and which form 
a  part of our life.1 Human beings inhabit these things - they are not simply 
represented to their conscience. Thanks to Levinas and his concept of 
enjoyment, we will be able to revalue the role of aesthetic experience through 
everyday aesthetics. I  will also consider the notions of alienation and 
reification, through which these attitudes have been interpreted by many 
thinkers in the philosophical tradition.
The text will be developed as follows: first, I  will introduce some common 
conceptions of everyday life within phenomenology and aesthetics. Later I will 
go on to deploy the Levinasian critique of these conceptions, and his notion of 
enjoyment as an alternative to them. I will then discuss the relevance of this 
concept for the aesthetics of everyday life and, finally, I will try to differentiate 
this aesthetic dimension from the more classical conceptions, those of the 
beautiful and the sublime.
2. The Beautiful Versus the Everyday
This character of aesthetic experience - a notion in which we generally do not 
include normal daily experiences such as preparing dinner (explicitly extra-
artistic experiences) but mainly arts such as music - could seem a  way of 
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trivialising both art and the concept of aesthetic experience by introducing 
them into our daily lives in the same way as a  perfume or scent is applied. 
However, underestimating these practices would, on the contrary, trivialise the 
constructive character that these aesthetic practices have in our daily lives, and 
how the choices of ambient music, or of any aesthetic decision that surrounds 
us in our day to day life, is characteristic of what we build as a home.
An eminent example of such an undervaluation of aesthetics in the everyday 
sphere can be found in the first chapter of José Ortega y Gasset’s  Essay on 
aesthetics as a preface, entitled Ruskin, usability and beauty. The relevance of his 
statements, in comparison with what we are going to argue here makes it 
worth quoting him at length:
Reading poetry is not something I do very often. is not one of my usual 
occupations. Generally speaking, I  cannot conceive that it could be 
anyone’s  regular occupation. Just as we demand a  certain seriousness 
for creating poetry, we should also demand a  certain seriousness for 
reading it. Not a seriousness that is all show, but rather that feeling of 
inner awe that invades our hearts at very special times. Contemporary 
pedagogy is beginning to have a  deplorable influence in the cultural 
realm of esthetics by making art a  usual normal, regulated thing. 
This way, we lose the feeling of distance; we lose our respect for and our 
fear of art; we approach it at any time in the dress and mood we happen 
to be in, and grow accustomed to not understanding it. The real 
emotion to which we refer when we sepak of aesthetic pleasure these 
days is [...] a  pale delight, lacking in vigor and depth, which merely 
touches the work of art.  [...] The English interpretation of things 
consists in their reduction to ordinary domestic objects. 
The  Englishman above all, aspires to live well, comfortably; what 
sensuality is to the Frenchman and philosophy to the German, comfort 
is to the Englishman. Now then, comfort and convenience, requires 
different conditions of things, different according to the vital function 
that in each case the convenience is intended to serve only one 
condition is generic, inevitable, and almost a  priori to everything 
convenient: that it be customary [...] Whatever we are not accustomed 
to, for the sole reason that we are not accustomed to it, makes us 
uncomfortable. [...] Naturally, such a view can only recommend to the 
intellect those arts that, to be exact, are not really art, the industrial or 
decorative arts. Ruskin insists on introducing Beauty into the severe, 
meek English home; to do this he must first domesticate it, weaken it, 
exhaust it. And so, reduced to a ghost, to an adjective, he leads it to the 
honourable dwellings of British subjects. [...] I need to drink water from 
a  clean glass, but don't give me a  beautiful one. [...] It would seem to 
me that in drinking water for it, I  drank the blood of a  fellow human 
being [...]. Either I attend to quenching my thirst or I attend to Beauty: 
a  middle term would be a  falsification of both. So  when I  am thirsty, 
please give me a glass that is full, clean and without beauty. (Ortega y 
Gasset, 1975, pp. 127-131)
It is not my intention to claim that Ortega y Gasset is wrong here. It is very 
likely that the ‘Authentic Beauty of Art’ is similar to what he points out, i.e., 
something that constitutes an event which is ‘exceptional’, ‘singular’ and 
necessary of a  certain ‘distance’; ultimately, the experience of art, especially 
since Kant’s aesthetics. But such an assertion can lead us to confusion, not only 
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2 In keeping with the spirit of Ortega y Gasset, Sartre comes to admit that the beautiful can 
only exist in an aesthetic attitude, considering ultimately that “the real is never beautiful. 
Beauty is a value that could never be applied more than to the imaginary and that involves the 
annihilation of the world in its essential structure. That is why it is stupid to confuse morality 
with aesthetics” (Sartre, 2004, p. 193). The beautiful, for Sartre, only exists in the imagining 
attitude as an annihilation of the world in the face of the realising attitude of practical life 
(in which the useful and the good are integrated). The beautiful is always an attitude (Sartre 
speaks of attitudes, not of objects or beautiful things) that makes an epoché of the reality of 
the world. There is no beauty without epoché, there is no beauty without an aesthetic 
attitude, according to Sartre.
3 “If the artwork promises this reconciliation, it is at the price of indefinitely deferring by 
rejecting any reconciliation that would hide the maintenance of alienation.” Unless otherwise 
indicated, translations of texts not originally published in English are by the author.
because it could be an apparent condemnation of our daily lives to a  kind of 
‘anaesthetic’ asceticism2, but because it is more than likely that the truth itself 
is missing.
Adorno’s  aesthetic theory is also a  good representative of this devaluation of 
aesthetic experience in everyday life. Quotations like “In the false world all 
ἡδονή is false” (Adorno, 1997, p. 36) or “to be entertained means to be in 
agreement” (Adorno, 2002, p. 115) are two good examples of this devaluation. 
His aesthetic conception is a  paradigmatic example of the idea of aesthetic 
experience understood as negativity, an idea common to both artistic and 
natural beauty. The autonomy that Adorno conceives for art is precisely what 
gives it its independence from other consumer objects. This autonomy 
constitutes the truth of art, which gives it a power that is, in turn, an essential 
lack. As power, art is shown as an autonomous object in the face of market and 
consumption that seem to encompass everything, but in doing so  it cannot 
show complacency in itself, rather it can only constitute a  reflection of the 
alienation of society. Art can only constitute a  negative experience that 
announces a  promise of happiness and reconciliation with respect to this 
alienated society. However, in Rancière’s  words, “mais si  l’ouvre promet cette 
réconciliation, c’est au prix de la différer indéfiniment en repoussant toutes les 
conciliations qui cacheraient le maintien de  l’aliénation” (Rancière, 2009, 
p. 138).3 The true value of art consists of reflecting and promising a home that, 
like an utopia, can never be built since, ultimately, if art fulfilled its promise, 
art itself would end (Adorno, 1997, p. 32).
Ultimately, art is essentially a promise and, therefore, it can never fulfill itself, 
since in that fulfillment the promise is no longer a promise. An understanding 
of the aesthetic experience within this discursive realm condemns it to 
absolute negativity, where there can be no solid ground on which to build 
a proper home. If aesthetic experience can only be a promise of happiness, it 
cannot build such happiness, but only announce it or reflect it.
Adorno’s global conception of aesthetics is representative of an aesthetic idea 
that continues to anchor aesthetic experience to a notion of the singularity of 
the work of art as an exceptional, distant and eminently negative moment that 
cannot be inhabited; inhabiting would indeed be related to the always-
despicable consumption. The industrial dimensions of art that are integrated 
as objects in our daily lives are not simply ignored but explicitly disregarded as 
they are related to consumption. Art, for Adorno, cannot be inhabited nor does 
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4 Levinas, years before this already mentioned the dangers of this kind of thought, especially 
referring to existentialist philosophies: “It enables one to denounce the joys of 
communication, collective works, and everything that makes the world livable, as Pascalian 
diversion and the simple forgetfulness of solitude. […] concern for things and needs would be 
a fall, a flight before the uttermost finality that these needs themselves imply, 
an inconsequence, a nontruth, inevitable, to be sure, but bearing the mark of the inferior and 
the reprehensible” (Levinas, 1987, p. 59).
5 “So neither must we take the fallenness of Dasein as a ‘fall’ from a purer and higher ‘primal 
status’ [...] We would also misunderstand the ontologico-existential structure of falling if we 
were to ascribe to it the sense of a bad and deplorable ontical property of which, perhaps, 
more advanced stages of human culture might be able to rid themselves” (Heidegger, 2001, 
p. 220). 
it seem to provide any positive dimension to pleasure or enjoyment. In what 
sense, therefore, can we understand all aesthetic phenomena we have 
described at the beginning in an eminently positive way?
If we withdraw from the puritanical condemnation of the everyday pleasures 
that could be derived from the above considerations (with all its compendium of 
degrading nouns, such as ‘consumption, ’reification’, ‘alienation’, ‘possession’, 
and so on), and rather observe them from the perspective of inhabiting, many of 
these practices gain a  new meaning and allow us to better understand the 
aesthetic relationship we have with our environment, not only in a  purely 
negative way, but also as a constitution of our ‘being in the world’.4 
3. Levinas and Enjoyment
Heidegger is a  common reference in the aesthetics of everyday life (see, for 
example, Haapala, 2005; Carreño, 2019; Leddy, 2014; Hainic, 2015) when seen 
from a phenomenological perspective. His analysis of everyday life in Being and 
Time or his ontology of the work of art in The Origin of the Work of Art provide 
extensive material for this aesthetics and its different branches. However, 
despite the meticulousness he employs to describe daily life in his main work 
Being and Time, the everyday is still a ‘fallen state’ for him, a kind of inauthentic 
affective position that represents a  fall in front of the anguish. Although 
Heidegger is ‘careful’ to consider this ontological-existential question not in 
a  moral but in a  structural way5, he clearly privileges the state of anguish 
described as a  fundamental temper or state of mind. Only through it can we 
have a proper access to Being.
Both in Totality and Infinity and, in a  more informative language, in Time and 
the  Other, Levinas explicitly positions himself against the primacy of the 
affective disposition of anguish in the face of the hypothetical inauthenticity of 
everyday life:
However much the entirety of preoccupations that fill our days and tear 
us away from solitude to throw us into contact with our peers are called 
‘fall’, ‘everyday life’, ‘animality’, ‘degradation’, or ‘base materialism’ 
these preoccupations are in any case in no way frivolous. One can think 
that authentic time is originally and ecstasis, yet one buys oneself 
a watch; despite the nudity of existence, one must as far as possible be 
decently clothed. And when one writes a book on anxiety, one writes it 
for someone, one goes through all the steps that separate the draft from 
the publication, and one sometimes behaves like a merchant of anxiety. 
The man condemned to die straightens out his uniform before his last 
walk, accepts a  final cigarette, and find an eloquent word before 
the salvo. (Levinas, 1987, pp. 59-60)
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6 Which Levinas calls the subject of hypostasis. 
7 Levinas refers especially to Husserl in these paragraphs. However, his considerations about 
the German author may not be particularly fair. This has been noticed by Harman in Guerrilla 
Metaphysics (2005, pp. 34-35).
8 “Whereas the recourse to the instrument implies finality and indicates a dependence with 
regard to the other, living from […] delineates independence itself, the independence of 
enjoyment and of its happiness, which is the original pattern of all independence.” (Levinas, 
1991, p. 110)
In the primacy that Levinas gives to the ethical relationship over ontology, 
everyday life is no longer understood as a  negative step of inauthenticity 
through things, but rather as a primal situation towards a genuine contact with 
otherness. As regards the considerations of the inauthentic Heideggerian 
Dasein, human beings, for Levinas, face their daily life with happiness, 
enjoying their nourishments. To live is, for Levinas, to enjoy in the first place, 
and enjoyment is the first step for that openness to the world that would allow 
us to access the ethical dimension. Without delving into the totality of Levinas 
metaphysical project and its complexities, I am interested here in the peculiar 
phenomenology of everyday life as enjoyment described by Levinas, in order to 
rescue   the type of particular intentionality that occurs in everyday aesthetic 
experience.
Levinas conceives the human being in their daily life as someone who “lives 
from”, not as a  completely independent subject6, but as a  being already 
‘entangled’ in things. “We live from ‘good soup’, air, light, spectacles, work, 
ideas, sleep, etc. These are not objects of representations... We live from 
them” (Levinas, 1991, p. 110). In other words, these objects (soup, air, light…) 
that constitute our living are not noemas in the manner of intentional objects, 
as in the Husserlian sense; they are not objects of representation for 
a consciousness. The representative intentionality that turns the objects of the 
world into noemas cannot properly inhabit the world precisely because it does 
not leave from itself, but rather reduces the world to the noema, to a clear and 
distinct idea that is immanent in thought. The world, from Levinas’ notion of 
representation only has what thought put into it, so it becomes a “first-person 
thought”.7 
However, the subject doesn’t even understand things in the way of tools, in the 
Heideggerian sense. The tool is always something direct towards an utility, 
something else beyond itself. In that case, the relationship of things would 
always be vicarious of a  subsequent sense to which the subject is dependent. 
The enjoyment of objects results in Levinas in an end in itself which is not 
dependent on any other need such as, for example, the preservation of material 
existence. That is why the subject of enjoyment is “independent”.8 The human 
being does not lament for having needs, as if they were only an intermediate 
step, a mere ‘tool’ in the pursuit of satisfying higher ulterior needs; rather they 
are pleased to have them, “what we live from does not enslave us; we enjoy it. 
[...] the human being thrives on his needs, he is happy for his needs” (Levinas, 
1991, p. 114). This happiness constitutes their own independence, 
the enjoyment of joy as the constitution of their own subjectivity: “Subjectivity 
originates in the independence and sovereignty of enjoyment” (Levinas, 1991, 
p. 114).
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9 It is important to clarify that enjoyment, as the concept of selfishness may show here, is not 
the ultimate form of ethical life for Levinas, but just the primal phase through which the 
subject – being open to the objects of enjoyment – may hear the call of the Great Other. 
To pass from the implicit to the explicit a master who evokes attention is necessary” (Levinas, 
1991, p. 138). That is to say, only if we pass through the experience of enjoyment will we be 
able to build a proper ethical relation with the Other in capital letters.
10 This idea is exposed more clearly in Time and the Other: “Prior to being a system of tools, the 
world is an ensemble of nourishments. Human life in the world does not go beyond the 
objects that fulfil it. It is perhaps not correct to say that we live to eat, but it is no more correct 
to say that we eat to live. The uttermost finality of eating is contained in food. When one 
smells a flower, it is the smell that limits the finality of the act. To stroll is to enjoy the fresh 
air, not for health but for the air. These are the nourishments characteristic of our existence in 
the world. It is an ecstatic existence – being outside oneself – but limited by the 
object” (Levinas, 1987, p. 63).
11 “The strength of the Kantian philosophy of the sensible likewise consists in separating 
sensitivity and understanding [...] Kant does indeed go beyond the phenomenology of the 
sensible. But at least he does recognize thereby that of itself the sensible is an apparition 
without there being anything that appears. Sensibility establishes a relation with a pure 
quality without support, with the element” (Levinas, 1991, p. 136). 
Faced with Husserl as with Heidegger, the intentionality of enjoyment builds 
its first independence in its original joyous contact with the world. This ’joyful’ 
consciousness faces the world not by affirming itself as an object, as in a form 
of representative spontaneity, but by exposing itself ‘indigently’ to it, bathing 
in that exteriority and allowing itself to be affected by it. That is why 
enjoyment takes the form of nourishment. To live is to love life and the 
constitution of subjectivity consists of nourishing ourselves with the world, not 
in the recollection of the subject in their interiority. In the words of Levinas, 
“Life is love of life, a relation with contents that are not my being, but more dear 
than my being: thinking, eating, sleeping, reading, working, warming oneself in 
the sun. Distinct from my substance, but constituting it, these contents make 
up the worth [prix] of my life...” (Levinas, 1991, p. 112).
In short, need, according to Levinas, is not constituted as a lack that has to be 
filled, but as something positive that not only causes pleasure, but only 
through that pleasure it is capable of constructing that first stage of 
subjectivity, “Living from, it is dependency that turns into, into happiness – 
essentially egoist sovereignty, essentially selfish happiness” (Levinas, 1991, 
p. 114).9 That is, the soul is only happy when it satisfies its needs, not when it 
gets rid of them. The independence of enjoyment from any subsequent need 
becomes paradigmatic in the aesthetic experience as in a play: “The aesthetic 
orientation man gives to the whole of his world represents a  return to 
enjoyment and to the elemental on a higher plane” (Levinas, 1991, p. 140) and: 
“The suspension or absence of the ultimate finality has a  positive face-the 
disinterested joy of play. To live is to play, despite the finality and tension of 
instinct to live from something without this something having the sense of 
a  goal or an ontological means-simply play or enjoyment of life” (Levinas, 
1991, p. 134).10 
Faced with the rationalistic spontaneity of representative intentionality, the 
proper modality of enjoyment intentionality is sensibility. In contrast to the 
cognitive dimension of the former, this one has a vital dimension. Here Levinas 
approaches Kant in a  kind of dualism between reason and sensibility.11 
Understanding and reason, for Kant, are faculties that give a background to the 
things which they focus on. Sensibility, on the other hand, is simply ‘content’ 
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12 “We can, to be sure, represent the liquid or the gaseous to ourselves as a multiplicity of solids, 
but we then are abstracting from our presence in the midst of the element. The liquid 
manifests its liquidity, its qualities without support, its adjectives without substantive, to the 
immersion of the bather” (Levinas, 1991, p. 132).
with finitude. While thought searches for the background, sensibility is content 
with the figure, the form in its concrete presence, or, as Levinas points out, 
“sensibility touches the reverse, without wondering about the obverse; this is 
produced precisely in contentment” (Levinas, 1991, p. 135). Sensibility is the 
quality of the finite, that which conceives it as something “by itself” (Levinas, 
1991, p. 136) a  pure appearance “without there being anything 
appearing” (Ibid.). Sensibility, in short, is the affective modality that has 
a  predilection for the finite as an end in itself: “The finite as contentment is 
sensibility” (Levinas, 1990, p. 138).
Sensibility is not an inferior theoretical knowledge bound however 
intimately to affective states: in its very gnosis sensibility is 
enjoyment; it is satisfied with the given, it is contented. Sensible 
‘knowledge’ does not have to surmount infinite regression, that vertigo 
of the understanding; it does not even experience it. It finds itself 
immediately at the term; it concludes, it finishes without referring to 
the infinite. [...] This earth upon which I  find myself and from which 
I  welcome sensible objects or make my way to them suffices for me. 
The  earth which upholds me does so  without my troubling myself 
about knowing what upholds the earth. I am content with the aspect of 
this corner of the world, the universe of my daily behavior, this city or 
this neighborhood or this street in which I  move, this horizon within 
which I  live, turn to me; I do not ground them in a more vast system. 
It  is they that ground me. I  welcome them without thinking them. 
I  enjoy this world of things as pure elements, as qualities without 
support, without substance. (Levinas, 1991, pp. 136, 137)
Sensitivity, insofar as its objects are not representations for a consciousness (as 
in representative intentionality), is not related to them as singularities. Rather, 
it is related to a world of pure apparitions or, as Levinas claims, of “adjectives 
without substantive” (Levinas, 1991, p. 132). It is what Levinas understands as 
the element: an undifferentiated quality that constitutes a kind of atmosphere 
in which human beings are introduced. But this quality is not ‘represented’ to 
me as we pointed out, rather it ‘wraps’ me, I  ‘bathe’ in it, “The relation 
adequate to its essence discovers it precisely as a medium: one is steeped in it; 
I am always within the element” (Levinas, 1991, p. 132). Although, in an ontic 
way, we could consider that the element is made up of different objects like 
water is made up of hydrogen and oxygen atoms, the form of enjoyment does 
not take water, to follow the metaphor, for its separate particles, rather it takes 
it as a continuum, as a pure quality, in which the bather immerses himself. 12  
It is important to note here that this ‘element’ is not an ontical quality in 
which all subjects are immersed in the same way, as if there were a universal 
element common to all human beings. This would go against Levinas’ 
philosophy in itself, since in that case the elemental would be conceived as 
a part of the totality and therefore, it would annul in itself the relationship of 
the Same with the Other, thus assuming the elemental within the 
representative logic in which the difference is determined by the identity. 
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13 “For Levinas, there is a single formless ele ment from which the things of our lives emerge [...] 
It is confined to a single passive or receptive layer of reality, and refuses to become entangled 
in all the manifold layers of objects. Strictly speaking, this would mean that enjoyment is 
always the same enjoyment” (Harman, 2005, p. 43.)
In other words, each ‘element’ indicates an existential dimension in which the 
subject immerses themselves in their world, which is, however, at each moment 
their own in the particular way that the relationship of the Same with the 
Other has to exist. The examples used by Levinas – soup, shows, ideas – always 
end with an ellipsis to indicate their hypothetical and contingent nature. 
The element can be anything in which a subject bathes as long as it is part of 
the element that constitutes the independence of this subject: the knot that 
individualises the steps of the subject’s  life. I  point this out to meet 
Harman’s criticism that seems to take this ‘element’ as constituting some kind 
of empirical substance.13 From Harman’s  perspective, the element into which 
human beings immerse themselves is always the same and, consequently, 
enjoyment is also the same. Harman seems to be unaware that Levinas 
provides us with an ontological structure and not an empirical-ontic one. 
The element refers to an existential dimension in which the things of our daily 
life are presented to us in enjoyment; it is not, thus, a literal element.
4. Enjoyment and Everyday Aesthetics
Enjoyment, understood in this way, introduces an ontological dimension in 
what we understand by everyday aesthetics. Thus, returning to what has been 
said before, I  will establish a  link between both concepts to clarify that this 
form of aesthetic experience is not simply an alienation, from the perspectives 
that we saw in the critical theory or Heidegger, but a  dimension of our 
subjectivity and a  fundamental aspect in the way in which we inhabit 
the world.
From the unreflective dimension characteristic of enjoyment, as we have seen, 
the objects of its daily life are not represented, but we inhabit them, so we are 
interior to them. Things do  not appear before us as objects of analysis or 
contemplation, we are inserted in them without them having to claim their 
presence to our attention. Their silent way of accompanying us in our day to 
day life is their specific way of existing. As Heidegger had already claimed: 
“The readiness-to-hand which belongs to any such region beforehand has the 
character of inconspicuous familiarity” (Heidegger, 2001, p. 137). A similar idea 
about everyday life can be found in Bataille as quoted by Highmore: “the  
everyday receives our daily inattention” (Highmore, 2002, p. 21). The only way 
that we can understand enjoyment as an experience of the everyday is as an 
experience of something that does not appear to our attentive consciousness 
precisely because it is extremely close to ourselves, something that we simply 
live without reflecting upon it. This calls into question the concept of 
experience devised by Dewey: “The enemies of the aesthetic are neither the 
practical nor the intellectual. They are the humdrum; slackness of loose ends; 
submission to convention in practice and intellectual procedure”  (Dewey, 
1958, p. 40). Dewey also faces Yuriko Saito’s  requirement for an aesthetic 
experience as developed in her Aesthetics of the Familiar: “Being attentive is 
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a  prerequisite for any kind of aesthetic experience” (Saito, 2017, p. 3). 
My  contention here, on the contrary, is that there is a  mode of aesthetic 
experience that does not entail this type of attention and that, in fact, exists 
precisely in that lack, in the pure life of those who attend to their ‘needs’ 
without representing them or singling them out from the rest of their lives. 
Returning to Highmore, “things become ‘everyday’ by becoming 
invisible” (Highmore, 2002, p. 21). This happens when things become invisible 
and take the form of a  kind of atmosphere or environment that is not 
‘confronted’ with me but through which I  am. As Arto Haapala (2005, p. 45) 
points out, “before being looked at [things] are looked through.” 
Haapala’s definition of ‘place’ has many resonances with what I have claimed 
about Levinas’ notion of element:
Together these things determine an ‘environmental character’, which is 
the essence of place. In general a place is given as such a character or 
‘atmosphere’. A  place is therefore a  qualitative, ‘total’ phenomenon, 
which we cannot reduce to any of its properties, such as spatial 
relationships, without losing its concrete nature out of sight. (Haapala, 
2005, p. 42)
For Haapala, our way of being in the world is the construction of a familiarity 
around us that, ultimately, is the way we have to ‘inhabit’ the world: “‘Placing’ 
is the process of ‘home building’. Familiarising oneself with the environment is 
home building in the sense that home is by definition of utmost familiarity. 
Home is a place where everything is familiar” (Haapala, 2004, p. 46).
In this sense, the lack of attention is no longer considered as a characteristic of 
the aesthetics of everyday life, but as a necessary condition for this experience 
to be lived as such.14 The fact of being immersed in the experience entails 
precisely its familiarity. Familiarity is that which never catches one’s attention, 
by simply being there, exerting its timid influence without ever standing out. 
Its mode of appearance is precisely that of hiding in the centre of our life, like 
Poe’s  stolen letter. As Haapala mentions in another text: “The ordinary, 
average everyday is closest to us, but for this very reason ‘the farthest and not 
known at all’. We are embedded in the structures of the everyday; they 
constitute our very existence. I  think that this is true also of the aesthetic 
aspects of the everyday: most often they go unnoticed because they are 
so close to us” (Haapala, 2018, p. 144). Although we can eventually rescue that 
dimension from eternal unconsciousness and realize the importance that these 
elements have in our lives, the genuine influence of the things in our daily 
existence has a different nature than when we pay attention to them. It is the 
fundamental difference between being involved in an activity and 
contemplating it. In her text The aesthetic value of the unnoticed, when 
considering the experience of a  ray of sunlight appearing every day in her 
office, Francisca Pérez Carreño points out that:
There is certainly something really lacking when I  stop typing on my 
computer and contemplate the sun entering through the balcony. What 
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is lacking is my own presence, my movements and actions inside the 
scene. I stop being part of the environment to become a beholder. And, 
consequently, my experience changes. (Carreño, 2019, p. 157)
However, as Carreño emphasises later, this lack of attention does not entail 
a lack of aesthetic pleasure, but rather that this pleasure is located on another 
place:
It is not that the non-aesthetic features of the object are aesthetically 
experienced only once they are attentively contemplated, but rather 
that the object was from the beginning aesthetically perceived, if non-
reflectively. There are some symptoms revealing that my activity was 
suffused with pleasure also during the time it was routine: I  didn’t 
realise the time passing, my body expressed calm and comfort, or 
I  smiled. Equally, children playing don't reflect about having fun, but 
they have: they jump, run and laugh. To the contrary, familiarity does 
not convert a  certain ugly building in our way home into something 
beautiful. Familiarity allows us to see it daily without paying attention 
to it. We don’t perceive its ugliness constantly, but from time to time 
we are sadly disappointed by its presence. (Ibid.)
A  lack of consciousness is not ultimately a  lack of experience, although such 
experience does not stand out as a singularity in consciousness. Rather, in this 
situation, the aesthetic phenomenon does not present itself to our 
consciousness as an objective noema, but as an elemental environment in 
which everything is offered mixed. Our enjoyment of food may not reside 
so much in the food in itself as in the summer environment that ‘enveloped’ it 
at that time, or perhaps the pleasure comes from the awareness that while 
I was eating this food I was with the person I  liked the most in the world, or 
maybe the grass was extraordinarily green that afternoon, or maybe it looked 
extraordinarily green because the person I  loved was there… That is, the 
aesthetic object fades into a  general synesthetic atmosphere in which all the 
sensations come together in a  style, an ‘element’ that does not differentiate 
itself in its particular parts by not being distinguished by consciousness. 
This dimension no longer assumes the object in its otherness, but rather in the 
feast of relationships that our sensibility projects. The object thus loses the 
sovereign autonomy of the work of art to become a relational nexus, in which 
what belongs to the subject and what belongs to the object is no longer clear.
This is the consequence of the absolute breakdown of distances. 
The object never appears to be confronting us as an object in itself, nor 
does it require specific attention from us, nor is the thing a  simple 
extension of myself, rather the thing is entangled in a whole system of 
values that introduces it into an existential structure of the subject. As 
Haapala points out: “The aesthetics of place is stamped by our 
existential structures; in one sense of the word, it is more subjective 
than the aesthetics of unfamiliar surroundings. (Haapala, 2005, p. 50)
Proust is one of the authors who have best understood the aesthetic dimension 
of our life beyond consciousness. All his reflection on involuntary memory 
points to the powerlessness of conscious memory to bring together the true 
essences of the past-in-itself. Voluntary memory, in its objectifying dimension, 
can scarcely make the past a  diffuse present, but it cannot bring its true 
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presence as past. However, even further, what involuntary memory does is 
precisely to recall episodes lived in the past that were retained in the 
unconscious and that explode from time to time. At that moment these 
episodes appear to the involuntary memory with all their beauty. However, if 
they are beautiful, if memory can recall the happiness of certain moments or 
particularly sensitive experiences, it is precisely because those experiences 
were fully lived, although not attentively. Each of the experiences that Proust 
describes in detail is full of extraordinarily rich and complex aesthetic 
dimensions that Proust, through the redemption of writing, will only unfold 
and objectify in the work of art by drawing from it its truth and its essence. 
Only distance can bring us back to the truth of certain facts, but only full 
presence can give us the material for such an experience. For example, the 
smell of one’s  grandmother’s  house can only be noticed after many months 
without visiting her, although this does not exempt that smell from being there 
from the beginning and from being experienced as such. Nevertheless, it was in 
such an intimate way that our conscience could hardly identify it, we just 
enjoyed its faithful closeness unconsciously.
In On Some Motives in Baudelaire, reflecting on involuntary memory and 
resorting to  Freud, Benjamin comments: “Put in Proustian terms, [...] only 
what has not been experienced explicitly and consciously, what has not 
happened to the subject as an experience [Erlebnis]15, can become a component 
of the memoire involontaire” (Benjamin, 2007, p. 160-161). It is sensitivity 
meant as a  purely passive quality, one that commands in these phenomena 
that the subject never thinks, but simply lives. Sensitivity, in Proust, becomes 
sovereign at the very moment when it alone can appear, as consciousness 
sleeps or withdraws:
For the truths which the intelligence apprehends through direct and 
clear vision in the daylight world are less profound and less necessary 
than those which life has communicated to us unconsciously through 
an intuition which is material only in so  far as it reaches us through 
our senses and the spirit of which we can elicit. (Proust, 2014, p. 237)
A reading of Proust from the perspective of everyday aesthetics has yet to be 
done, however. Here I have just pointed out some ideas that link to my thesis. 
However, Proustian oeuvre could be considered as an artistic work that 
constantly redeems these unconscious aesthetic experiences enunciating their 
truth through the artistic work. Examples of this would be numerous, and 
would extend beyond the scope of the present essay.
5. Enjoyment and the Experience of the Pleasant, the Beautiful and the 
Sublime
Enjoyment, as I have pointed out, is an eminently subjective and subjectivising 
experience. The elements that surround us as defining our being in the world 
adhere to us and therefore, despite being outside of us and being recognised as 
such otherness, are collected in the territory of the Same. If we rely on 
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a  Kantian conception, the existence of objects of pleasure is required as 
a necessary condition for the experience of enjoyment, making it an experience 
that would not satisfy the necessary requirements, neither those of quality nor 
of quantity, for such an experience to be considered aesthetic, both according 
to the beautiful and to the sublime. This experience is not disinterested, since 
the existence of the object is required beyond its mere contemplation, nor is it 
universal, since the aesthetic world that surrounds me is constitutive precisely 
of my subjectivity. If we were to assume Kantian categories, only the faculty of 
sensitivity would intervene in the experience of enjoyment, that is, 
the  aesthetic faculty in the sense of the Critique of Pure Reason. Therefore, 
there would be no free play between imagination and   understanding, but only 
this passive faculty. 
In the case of the sublime, the distance is even greater since while preserving 
the essential characteristics of the beautiful – universality and disinterest – 
reason is the intervening faculty. In the experience of the sublime, it is not the 
object that produces the experience; rather, the object is only a medium for the 
discovery in ourselves of a faculty that is superior to any of the senses: Reason. 
As Kant points out in his Critique of Judgement (1987, p. 106): “Sublime is what 
even to be able to think proves that the mind has a  power surpassing any 
standard of sense.” The pain and pleasure experienced in the sublime is the 
confirmation of an idea that cannot be schematised through imagination. 
Thus, there is, on the one hand, the acknowledgment of the separation via the 
rejection of the object, and on the other, the satisfaction in the 
acknowledgement of a moral superiority in us.
In Lyotard’s  concept of the sublime the scheme changes. As Rancière 
comments, it is no longer imagination that is powerless but reason itself in the 
face of the pure alterity of the sensible. “Elle manifeste la servitude de 
la  pensée à  l’égard d’une puissance intérieure à  l’esprit, et antérieure à lui, 
qu’il s’efforce en vain de maîtriser” (Rancière, 2004, p. 126).16 
In both, however, whether the accent is placed on one faculty or the other, the 
experience of the sublime manifests itself as the absolute opposite of what we 
understand here by enjoyment. That is to say, the sublime is the verification of 
a  separation within ourselves that privileges one side, either reason, which 
revitalizes our moral superiority in front of the natural world, or sensitivity, 
which revitalizes this world that will never cease to be mysterious to us. 
In enjoyment, the experience is not of separation, but of union. Enjoyment, as 
we saw, is ‘content’ with the appearance without projecting any kind of infinity 
on it; it is satisfied with the pure appearance and with its clash with sensibility. 
In this sense, enjoyment is spiritualised, but is content with mere sensation, 
and thereby brings us closer to the sensation of what is pleasant.
This satisfaction of enjoyment, a  completely interested and subjective 
happiness, therefore departs from all the honorary aesthetic categories 
indicated by classical aesthetics. It consciously moves away without entailing 
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a  kind of feeling of inferiority, but rather supposes a  different stage of the 
constitution of the subjectivity, i.e., of the movement between the Same and 
the Other. In Levinas we read that “enjoyment, as interiorisation, runs up 
against the very strangeness of the earth” (Levinas, 1991, p. 142). Enjoyment is 
a process of selfhood and familiarisation. The movement of the sublime, on the 
contrary, is the presentation of a strangeness. It is the phenomenal display of 
something that we can never fully inhabit, an experience of negativity and 
absence. Enjoyment is fulfillment and satisfaction.
Contentment, as we have seen, characterised sensitivity in the experience of 
enjoyment as that which did not go beyond appearance. This was done by 
Levinas to highlight the passive dimension, in a phenomenological sense, that 
enjoyment possesses as it is governed by the faculty of sensitivity. However, the 
fact that one is simply content does not imply that one only stays on the 
‘surface’. In any case, this surface already gives us access, in its immediacy, to 
a  symbolic depth without ‘presenting it to consciousness’. This, therefore, 
involves an important leap, so  much so  that Levinas’ apparently radical 
division between reason and sensitivity can make us confused, since what is 
apparently done is to link reason with activity and sensitivity with passivity. 
When understanding the symbolic value of our passive attitude, what Husserl 
would call passive synthesis, we could consider that this aesthetic dimension of 
enjoyment is not simply a  passive letting go of the world, but, in effect, 
a  primal form of symbolic appropriation of the world. Alluding to this 
experience, Simon Høffding and Tone Roald claim what follows:
Referring to passive syntheses does not mean that the subject is 
passive or inert. Think of my simple perception of the tree outside my 
window. I  direct my attention to it, but its appearance is not 
exhaustively explained by this attention. [...] The tree is in the attentive 
foreground, but, like any figure-ground constellation, the surroundings 
or other ‘features’ – these familiar buildings, given from this particular 
angle in this particular light – enclosing it, partly constitute what 
makes it ‘this tree’. And emotions of nostalgia and anticipation are 
likewise activated, as I see its first little spring leaves, reminding me of 
this season of lush growth and of the past springs during which I've 
seen the tree. None of these associations are actively or purposively 
initiated by me, but co-presented as immanent in the perception of the 
tree. (Høffding and Roald, 2019, p. 7)
Merleau-Ponty, more than Levinas, constantly sought to establish a  union 
between matter and spirit, sensibility and reason, first from the concept of 
body and, lastly, through the concept of flesh. Without entering into Merleau-
Ponty’s  phenomenology, I  would like to conclude this section with a  quote 
from the posthumous work The Visible and The Invisible, in which Merleau-
Ponty states precisely that the everyday and apparently passive character of 
objects is not without depth, but rather implies a  whole symbolic network, 
since the “sensible itself […] is capable of establishing itself up on a  level or 
horizon” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 237).   
It is perhaps from this dimension that the constitutive character of our 
unreflective aesthetic experience could be better understood, without having 
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to consider that there is a  duality between understanding/reason and 
sensitivity. In The world of perception he expresses this idea:
The things of the world are not simply neutral objects which stand 
before us for our contemplation. Each one of them symbolises or recalls 
a particular way of behaving, provoking in us reactions which are either 
favourable or unfavourable. This is why people’s  tastes, character, and 
the attitude they adopt to the world and to particular things can be 
deciphered from the objects with which they choose to surround 
themselves, their preferences for certain colours or the places where 
they like to go for walks. (Merleau-Ponty, 2004, p. 63)
Ultimately, the experience of enjoyment departs from the classical aesthetic 
categories devised in the Kantian model, insofar as the requirements of 
disinterest and universality are not met. Although we can consider them as 
closer to the pleasant, these objects of enjoyment are not simply objects of 
an  absolutely passive sensibility, but the enjoyment with these elements is 
symbolically charged. The objects with which we surround ourselves constitute 
our home, our first appropriation and, ultimately, the first step of our 
subjectivity. The pleasure of enjoyment with objects is sensitive but not 
thereby   irrational. Rather, it is sensitive in the way of the unreflective, but this 
sensitivity, also relying on Merleau-Ponty, is loaded with meaning.
6. Conclusions
The concept of enjoyment in Levinas has allowed us to understand a possible 
model of ontological understanding of the aesthetic experience in everyday 
life. The idea is, therefore, to capture the role that pleasantness, sympathy or 
attraction in general have in our daily lives as a  way of constructing and 
edifying our personality. Daily life is not exempt from aesthetic experience, as 
we constantly make unconscious judgments that make us approach some 
objects rather than others; surround ourselves with objects that are more 
pleasant to us than others; schedule when to go outside; dress a specific color 
of clothing, and so on. All these aesthetic choices do not entail the realisation 
of an epoché of our natural attitude, but are precisely the essence of it. 
The way in which we enjoy life; how we ‘wrap’ ourselves in the objects that we 
love, constitute an extension of our subjectivity that, despite being referred to 
as the Same, is not the Same, but part of a world that enfold us: the world of 
our objects, customs, desires, ideas and pleasures.
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